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ARTICLES

ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY AND THE CONTEXT OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

Cynthia Shawamreh*
INTRODUCTION

This article will provide an overview of classical Islamic legal theory
and explore the political and economic context of modem Islamist movements
in the Middle East. The dramatic transformations to the political, legal, and
economic systems of the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth century
left a legacy of systematic secularization, centralization of authority, and
westernization. Modern Islamist political movements raise broad calls for
change that currently resonate with large portions of widely discontent Middle
Eastern populations. Once in power these diverse movements are faced with
political, legal, and economic institutions that are thoroughly entrenched in this
legacy. Islamists calling generally for a return to Shari'a must, when
governing, resolve a myriad of questions defining how to actually implement
Shari'a in the current political and economic context.
ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY

Islamic legal theory posits that law is divine in nature and in substance,
and that there is a "right" answer for every imaginable question that is
contained in the Shari'a. The Shari'a, however, as divine law, is transcendent
and essentially unknowable. The human effort to determine the content of the
Shari'a is known in Islamic legal theory as "fiqh." Classical Sunni legal theory
crystallized around the tenth century CE 1 with the emergence of four distinct
* Cynthia Shawamreh is a Lecturer in Law at The University of Chicago Law School.
She is also Senior Counsel at the City of Chicago Department of Law, Finance and Economic
Development Division.
1All references to dates in this article will be according to the Common Era meanings.
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schools of orthodox Sunni jurisprudence. 2 These four schools are commonly
referred as Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali, after the name of the founding
scholar attributed to each. These schools, called "madhhab," today generally
tend to be spread geographically across the Muslim world.3 Shi'i legal theory
developed distinctly from Sunni theory, although it followed generally similar
patterns and methodologies. 4 While each school differs from one another in
the details of both legal methodology and content, certain broad parameters of
thought are held in common. Classical Sunni legal theory is known as "usul-ifiqh," translated roughly as the fundamental principles of jurisprudence.
Usul-i-fiqh posits that there are four basic sources of Islamic law.
These sources are the Qur'an, Hadith, consensus (ijma), and 'ijtihad. 6 The text
of the Qur'an is the first of these four sources. Qur'anic text, revealed by God
to the Prophet Muhammad, contains around 6,200 verses, of which
approximately 500 verses include specifically legal content.7
There is
widespread consensus among Muslims about the text of the Qur'an, which was
standardized and codified during the reign of the third Sunni Caliph, Uthman
(r. 644-656 CE).' During the formative period of Islamic history, a distinct
class of scholars emerged, who meticulously studied religious text and
grappled with its meaning for governing human society. If a legal situation
was covered by explicit Qur'anic text, the result was relatively straightforward.
However, even in these relatively clear cases, these early scholars wrestled
with questions of interpretation. 9 For example, a well-known Qur'anic verse

2 See generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW (2005).
3 See WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 31-37 (2009).
4 See MOOJAN MOMEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHI'I ISLAM 184-85 (1985). Twelver
Shi'ism roughly followed most of the legal and juristic forms of the Sunni model, with a delay
of approximately two centuries. The scope and content of the Hadith differs, however, as for
Twelver Shi'i the Traditions of the Twelve Imams who succeeded to the authority of the
Prophet Muhammad are considered infallible. Discussion of the branches of Shi'ism other
than Twelver Shi'ism is beyond the scope of this article.
5 Author's translation.
See WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARI'A: THEORY, PRACTICE,
TRANSFORMATIONS 59 (2009) for the definition "legal theory;" Knut VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD
AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 3 (2005) for the definition "the roots of
jurisprudence;" and BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW xi (1998) for the
definition "theoretical jurisprudence."
6 See WAEL B. HALLAQ, ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL
AL-FIQH 1 (1997). The second two sources of law, consensus and 'ijtihad, are derived through
the text of the first two sources, Qur'an and Hadith.
7 Id. at 3; see also VIKOR, supra note 5 at 33 for an alternative estimate of 350 verses with
specifically legal content.
8 See HUGH KENNEDY, THE PROPHET AND THE AGE OF THE CALIPHATES: THE ISLAMIC
NEAR EAST FROM THE SIXTH TO THE ELEVENTH CENTURY 70 (2d ed. 2004); THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO THE QUR'AN (Jane Dammen McAuliffe, ed., 2006) (discussing of the
compilation of the Uthmanic codex) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE COMPANION].
See WEISS, supra note 5, at 88-112.
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commands that the hand of the thief be cut off. The verse reads: "As to the
thief, male (al-sariq) or female (al-sariqa), cut off his or her hands."10
Early scholars debated the precise meaning of the word "hand" (yad).
Does "yad" refer to the space from the fingertips to the wrist, the fingertips to
the elbow, or the fingertips to the shoulder? The gender is clear in this
particular verse to include both male and female thieves, but many verses are
ambiguous as to gender. The definite article "al" (the) is used before the word
"thief," but does this refer to a particular individual thief? Is the reference to
all thieves, or certain particular thieves? If the reference is to thieves
generally, does that include all thieves for all time, or only the thieves living at
the time of revelation? Is the text referring to both hands or to a single hand?
If it means a single hand, is it the right hand or the left hand?
What is the meaning of "iqta'u" (cut oft)? Scholars debated if the hand
should be severed or instead merely lacerated. The imperative form of the
verb "iqta'u" is used. Does this mean God has commanded all Muslims to
carry out this command or only the ruler of the Muslims? Does the imperative
form grammatically imply that cutting off the hand of the thief is required as a
duty, or is it merely an exhortation or an expression of permission?" In
addition to these complex grammatical questions, this verse cannot be read in
isolation. The very next verse reads: "But if the thief repents after his crime,
and amends his conduct, Allah turneth to him in forgiveness; for Allah is OftForgiving, Most Merciful."12 In addition to the specific Qur'anic text, scholars
had to consider Hadith which clarified that punishment for theft should not be
applied in cases where the value of what was stolen was de minimus. 13
Scholars also determined numerous qualifications and rules around application
of penalties for theft, including elevated evidentiary standards associated with
the "hudud" crimes, of which theft was one. The category of "hudud" crimes
is a very limited set of crimes, 14 for which text specifies both the crime and the
punishment. The implementation of these particular punishments is subject to
very high evidentiary procedural safeguards.
To better analyze text, complex study of the rules of Arabic grammar
developed. The choices individual scholars made regarding linguistic analysis
were applied consistently to different portions of Qur'anic text, making
selection of those choices extremely important. Different scholars came to
different conclusions about the meaning of the same text through different
10 Qur'an 5:38. See 'ABDULLAH YUSUF
for translations of the Qur'an in this article.

'ALI, THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR'AN (1992)

11 See WEISS, supra note 5, at 101 -11.
12

Qur'an 5:39.

13 See 4 ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SAHIH MUSLIM, Hadith 4398-

4409, at 454-58

(Maktaba Dar-us-Salam ed., 2007).

14 See generally RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW:
THEORY
AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005). See also

VIKOR, supra note 5, at 282-96. Hudud crimes are generally considered to be 1) theft, 2)
banditry (or highway robbery), 3) unlawful sexual intercourse, 4) an unfounded accusation of
unlawful sexual intercourse, 5) drinking alcohol, and according to some schools, 6) apostasy.
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linguistic assumptions. For example, if a scholar determined that use of the
imperative verb form in a text implied a binding command from God rather
than an exhortation, that determination would have implications in other
textual examples. Grammatical analysis helped in the evaluation of several
types of linguistic ambiguity in the text. Certain verses were considered to be
"clear" in meaning while others contained meaning that was "hidden." Some
verses were considered to be "general" ("'amm") while others were considered
"specific" ("khass"). 16 Certain Arabic words in Qur'anic text had fallen out of
common usage or had multiple possible meanings, like the word "eye" or
"bank" in English. The "eye" of a storm obviously has a different meaning
than the "eye" on a face. The words "I went to the bank today," would have a
completely different meaning when stated by an urban dweller in a monetary
economy than if stated by a rural individual residing near the bank of a river.17
In addition to the development of grammatical analysis, scholars
gathered as much historical material as possible in order to consider the
context of the text. Analysis of the specific historical background in which
each portion of text was revealed developed into a field known as "asbab alnazul" (circumstances of the revelation)." Historical sources were compiled,
checked and cross-checked in order to place the verses in their precise context,
shedding light on the nuance and possible meanings of the text. Scholars
further developed a theory of "naskh" (abrogration) to reconcile portions of
Qur'anic text, which were apparently in conflict with other portions of
Qur'anic text. In these cases, one of the texts was determined to have repealed
the other. Several factors were considered in determining which text would
repeal another, including the chronological sequence of revelation. 19 Scholars
debated God's motives for abrogation, whether Qur'anic text could abrogate
Hadith, whether Hadith could abrogate later Hadith, whether Hadith could
abrogate Qur'anic text, the necessity of consensus in determining abrogation,
and whether only certain epistemological types of text could abrogate other
text.20 Common examples of abrogation include the progressive nature of
revelation regarding the prohibition of wine-drinking, and the command to face
towards Mecca in prayer, repealing the practice of facing towards Jerusalem.
The second source of Islamic law after the Qur'an is the text of the
Hadith. Hadith are the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad reported
by his companions. The Hadith were meticulously sorted through and
analyzed by scholars in the ninth century, with many thousands of Hadith
discarded as unreliable. Hadith are generally presented with two parts. The
content of the Hadith (the "matn") is preceded by a "chain of transmission"
15See WEISS, supra note 5, at 103-06.
16 See

VIKOR, supra note 5, at 34.
WEISS, supra note 5, at 98.
18See CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 8, at 184-85; VIKOR, supra note 5, at 47.
19 See CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 8, at 187. See also HALLAQ, supra note 6, at
17 See

68-74 (discussing the nuances of the theory of abrogation).
20

See VIKOR, supra note 5, at 47-52. See also HALLAQ, supra note 5, at 92-98.
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known as the "isnad." 21 These chains of transmission identify which
individual heard from which individual and so on back to a companion of the
Prophet himself, who states what he or she witnessed first-hand.
Scholars vigorously examined each "isnad" and developed a system of
evaluating their trustworthiness. The biographical history of each individual in
the chain of transmission was explored in a process known as "'ilm al-rijal."22
The individual's character, reliability, and personal trustworthiness were
evaluated. Any gaps in the chain of transmission were identified. Similarly,
any spots in the chain that were improbable due to the individuals not living at
the same time or in the same place were identified. The number of times the
content of a particular Hadith was repeated from different sources, known as
"tawatur," was noted and impacted the weight of a Hadith's reliability. 23 The
Hadith that remained after undergoing this analysis are contained in several
well-known collections and are generally considered reliable. 24 The remaining
Hadith are divided into categories indicating their strength, as "trustworthy,"
"well-known," "good," "weak," and "disliked." 25 The relative strength or
weakness of a Hadith can be taken into account in legal rulings.
The evaluation and content of the Hadith is a significant point of
difference between Shi'i and Sunni legal thought.26 The wife of the Prophet
Aisha, for example, is a major source of Hadith transmission for Sunnis. In
light of Aisha's rebellion after the Prophet's death against the first Shi'i Imam
(and fourth Sunni Caliph) 'Ali ib 'Abi Talib,27 however, Shi'i scholars would
not consider her trustworthy. Sayings and actions of the twelve Shi'i Imams
also have legal import in Twelver Shi'i legal theory which is absent in Sunni
theory. In Twelver Shi'i legal theory, each of the twelve Imams is infallible
and transmits knowledge of the law with certainty.28
The third source of Islamic law is "ijma" (consensus). Early scholars
debated the meaning of consensus in the context of determining binding law. 29
Consensus refers to an agreement on the meaning of text contained in the first
two sources of law, Qur'anic text and Hadith. The question of whose
agreement was necessary for a consensus was critical. Most early scholars felt
that it was the agreement of qualified scholars that was necessary, rather than
the entire Muslim community. Even accepting the narrower definition,
21 VIKOR, supra note 5, at 39.
22

Id. at 44.

See WEISS, supra note 5, at 47-52.
24 VIKOR, supra note 5, at 43.
25 Id. at 42. See also generally WEISS, supra note 5.
26 See MOMEN, supra note
4 at 185.
27 Aisha, in collaboration with two of the Prophet's companions
Zubayr and Talha, rose
against the authority of 'Ali as Caliph at the Battle of the Camel in 656 CE. See MOMEN,
supra note 4, at 24; KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 75-76. See also BARNABY ROGERSON, THE
HEIRS OF MUHAMMAD: ISLAM'S FIRST CENTURY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SUNNI-SHIA SPLIT
23

286-98 (2006).
28
29

See HALLAQ, supra note 5, at 115.
See HALLAQ, supra note 6, at 75-81.

201

202

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2012

pressing questions remained unanswered. What level of scholarship was
necessary to be counted among the qualified scholars? Was the agreement of
local scholars sufficient or did all scholars everywhere have to participate for a
binding consensus to be reached? Was lack of objection the same as assent to
a legal position, or did an affirmative declaration of agreement have to be
obtained? Was it sufficient to consider only living scholars at a given time to
declare a consensus, or were earlier scholars to be included? What about
scholars not yet alive? With these difficult logical concerns, only a few
matters are considered to be contained within this legal category. 30
The fourth and final basic source of Islamic law is "'ijtihad." 'Ijtihad
means to strive, to make an effort in the sense of using one's utmost rational
intellect. 'Ijtihad developed very early in the formative period of Islamic law.
"Qiyas," or reasoning by analogy, is the most common form of 'ijtihad in
Sunni jurisprudence. The scholar Shafi'i (founder of one of the four Sunni
legal schools) articulated this concept in his landmark work al-Risala around
813 CE. 31 To illustrate the concept of 'ijtihad," Shafi'i used the example of the
Qur'anic injunction for Muslims to pray in the direction of the Ka'ba in
Mecca. 32 What is one to do when the Ka'ba is beyond the range of vision?
What if one is in a desert far away from Mecca? Shafi'i wrote that God has
given humans signs in the natural world such as the stars, the mountains, the
rivers, light, and darkness. 33 From these signs, humans can strive to use their
rational intellect ('ijtihad) to determine, according to the best of their ability,
the direction of Mecca. Even if one errs in this determination, having striven
to the best of one's ability to deduce the proper direction for prayer is
praiseworthy in the sight of God.
Similar to the signs of the natural world, Shafi'i argued, God has given
humanity "signs" in the verses of the Qur'an. The Arabic word for Qur'anic
verses, "ayat," literally means "signs." We must use these signs to guide us in
the determination of legal results through reasoning by analogy when the text
is not explicit. 34 Although these legal results can never be absolutely certain,
the use of human rational intellect to strive to reach the right result is pleasing
to God.
The historical context of Shafi'i's work was the struggle between
people who advocated using "ra'ay" (opinions) freely for legal decisions, and
people who argued for strict use of explicit text.35 Shafi'i's theory managed to
reconcile these positions, providing legal jurisdiction in a wider context of
situations that are not explicitly covered by text without abandoning text
30 See VIKOR, supra note 5, at 74-86.
31See HALLAQ, supra note 6, at

21.

32 See id at 23.
See id
3 See id
3 See HALLAQ, supra note 2, at 113-21. A full discussion of the political and economic
context of the early development of Islamic legal theory, including the impact of the
geographical expansion of Islamic civilization, is beyond the scope of this article.
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entirely. By tying legal decision-making to narrow and strict analogical
reasoning from text, Shafi'i set the groundwork for the most essential
parameter in the development of Sunni legal theory during the following
centuries.
Reasoning by analogy is common in some form in most legal systems.
In Islamic law "qiyas," reasoning by analogy, takes several forms. Two simple
examples of classical qiyas will illustrate this point. One form of qiyas is the
following: Case A is like Case B; Case A results in ruling X, therefore Case B
also results in ruling X. As an example, Qur'anic text prohibits the
consumption of "khamr," translated as grape-wine. The question arose in the
early period whether date-wine was also prohibited.36 The Qur'anic text does
not explicitly prohibit the consumption of date-wine, so how did scholars
determine that it too, was prohibited? Case A (consumption of grape-wine is
prohibited) had a ruling with explicit text. Case B (consumption of date-wine)
was determined by analogy to be like Case A, and therefore the text-based
ruling of Case A was transferred to Case B (drinking date-wine is prohibited
because it is like drinking grape-wine).
The most important part of this process is determining the meaning of
the word "like" in the above example. How is drinking date-wine "like"
drinking grape-wine? Is it because both are liquids? How do we know the
textual ruling prohibiting drinking grape-wine is not based on the particular
appearance of grape-wine, and is therefore not transferable to date-wine?
Scholars determined that the most probable reason for the prohibition of grapewine was that it is an intoxicant, which diminishes human rationality. Since
date-wine is a similar intoxicant, they reasoned by analogy that its
consumption would also be forbidden. The critical point is determining the
reason for the text-based ruling, known as the "'illa" (effective cause).37
Finding the most appropriate probable effective cause is the key to reasoning
by analogy in Islamic law. In this example, the effective cause is fairly easily
determined to be the property of intoxication, which diminishes human
rationality. In countless other examples over the centuries, determining the
effective cause of a text-based ruling is not so simple. Scholars were very
careful about not generalizing the implications of an effective cause beyond a
narrow construction for a particular case.
The second example of how reasoning by analogy might be structured
in classical qiyas is as follows: Case A has ruling X; Case B is contained
within Case A and therefore also results in ruling X. An illustration of this
point is the text-based prohibition on cursing one's parents. The question then
arises: does the prohibition also apply to hitting one's parents? The Qur'anic
text does not explicitly prohibit hitting one's parents. However, it should be
obvious that if an individual cannot curse his or her parents, that individual
also cannot hit his or her parents. The logical reasoning here is that hitting
36 See WEISS, supra note 5, at
67.

3 See VIKOR, supra note 5, at 54-65.
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one's parents exceeds the boundaries of the prohibition of cursing one's
parents and is therefore contained within it. Once again, this example
illustrates an easily determined ruling. However, not all rulings which are
arguably "contained within" a text-based ruling are always easily determined
and transferred.38
These four sources of Islamic law (Qur'an, Hadith, consensus and
'ijtihad) provide the main outline of classical Sunni jurisprudence. Certain
secondary principles are also used when these sources alone are not sufficient.
"Darura" (necessity) is sometimes invoked to override a text-based result. The
most common example of necessity is the permissibility of eating pork, which
is textually forbidden, if one would otherwise starve. Other secondary
principles include "maqasid," looking to the purposes of the law, "istihsan,"
juristic preference, and "maslaha," rulings in the best interests of the
community. 39 Different schools vary in how much flexibility they permit
scholars to use in the application of these secondary principles to go beyond
the text.
By the fourteenth century, scholars had developed a theory of maqasid
that identified five general purposes or higher objectives in the content of the
law. These purposes are the protection of: 1) life, 2) the ability to practice
Islam, 3) property, 4) children, and 5) human rationality. 40 This theory was
used to assist in the determination of the "'illa" (effective cause) in classical
reasoning by analogy. Scholars would analyze the proposed 'illa to ensure that
it promoted one of these general purposes of the law, thereby increasing its
credibility as a probable effective cause whose ruling could be transferred.41
Scholars also developed five legal categories into which all human behavior
can be divided: 1) prohibited, 2) discouraged, 3) neutral, 4) recommended, or
42
5) obligatory. The classification of an action by placing it within one of these
categories has legal import. For example, prayer and fasting are obligatory.
Consumption of pork or alcohol is prohibited. Smoking, on the other hand, is
discouraged but not specifically prohibited.
Another set of categories developed by scholars to help sort through the
complexity of Islamic law is the division of rules into two general categories:
1) "'ibadat," and 2) "mu'amalat." 'Ibadat concerns the rules which govern the
relationship between humans and God. For example, prayer and fasting fall

38 See WEISS,

supra note 5, at 66-87.

See also generally HALLAQ, supra note 6
(discussing 'ijtihad, including examples of these two forms of classical reasoning by analogy).

3 See Felicitas Opwis, Islamic Law and Legal Change: The Concept of Maslaha in
Classical and Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory, in SHARI'A: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 62-82 (Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel eds., 2007) (discussing

maslaha).
40 See generally AHMAD

AL-RAYSUNI, IMAM AL-SHATIBI'S THEORY OF THE HIGHER

OBJECTIVES AND INTENTS OF ISLAMIC LAW (2005) (discussing maqasid).
41 See VIKOR, supra note
5, at 62.
42 See WEISS, supra note 5, at 18-20; VIKOR, supra
note 5, at 36-37.
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into this category.
Mu'amalat concerns the rules which govern the
relationships among and between humans. 43
Islamic legal theory over the centuries developed into a complex and
sophisticated legal system. Western legal systems are generally considered to
be based in common law, where judges decide cases that govern as a body of
binding precedent, or codified law, where predetermined statutory legal codes
serve as the basis for judicial decisions. Some legal systems, like that of the
United States, present a combination of these two approaches. Islamic legal
theory offers a third model, which is sometimes called juristic law. In this
system, individual judges must determine the right result in each case. While
previous decisions in similar cases may be informative, they are not binding, as
each capable scholar is expected to engage with the text and perform their own
legal analysis through 'ijtihad. 44 This has been described as a microcosmic
system. 45 The ideal in this system is the determination of the most probably
correct result in each individual case through the use of the utmost capacity of
human rational intellect. The Shari'a, or God's unknowable, divine and
transcendent law, contains a just result for every imaginable situation. "Fiqh,"
the human effort to determine what that result might be, will only ever be
probable at best and can never be known with absolute certainty. This
theoretical approach conceptually permits, and even favors, tolerance and
pluralism.
The microcosmic system can be juxtaposed to macrocosmic systems,
which are rule-based systems such as common law or codified law. In a
macrocosmic system, the law is external and the rules are pre-determined and
broadly applied. However, in actual implementation, this theoretical approach
is modified by legal principles such as equity. The limitation of macrocosmic
theory is the problem of extenuating circumstances, when application of a predetermined set of rules dictates an obviously unjust result. In such cases,
equity is used to modify the unjust result.
Conversely, the limitation of microcosmic theory is the risk of
unpredictability associated with not knowing the rules in advance. In actual
implementation, Islamic legal systems have modified this risk through the
extreme deference scholars give to the work of earlier scholars. In practice,
most scholars have usually followed the legal determinations contained within
the various schools, 46 or at most patched rulings across the schools (a
controversial practice known as "talfiq") when in theory they are charged with

43 See VIKOR, supra note 5, at 68.
44 See generally, VIKOR, supra note 5; WEISS, supra note 5; HALLAQ, supra note 6.
45 See FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA

23-32 (2000).
46 See Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate qfljtihad Closed?, INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUDIES,

Mar. 1984, at 3-34. This deference led earlier academics to say that the "gates of 'ijtihad"
were closed in the early centuries. Hallaq has conclusively demonstrated that despite these
outer forms of deference, 'ijtihad continued in many forms both directly and indirectly.
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the task of individual 'ijtihad.47 This practical modification creates the
stability and predictability of a functioning system while still allowing for
flexibility, mutual tolerance and the possibility of adaptation over time and
location.
LOCATION OF THE LAW

In light of the flexible nature of Islamic legal theory, the question of
who interprets Islamic law becomes central. Considering the balance of power
in the relationship between rulers and scholars in Islamic societies at different
times and locations is a useful analytical tool. The emergence of the four
Sunni schools of law in the tenth century provided an increasingly stable and
predictable system of law by crystallizing the content of the law in practice,
while still adapting for local conditions across the Islamic world. This stability
and predictability served a useful social function during times of political
uncertainty. As rulers vied for power and dynasties replaced one another, the
class of scholars who emerged and interpreted the law managed to remain
generally distinct from these political shifts. 48 The rulers who gained power
looked to these scholars to lend credibility to their reign, establishing a tenuous
balance of power between scholars and rulers. This balance of power varied
tremendously over time and place, tilting in favor of one side or the other, and
sometimes even collapsing together entirely, as in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
where the scholars in theory became the rulers. In some societies where the
balance was relatively even, the power struggle between scholars and rulers
served as a check and balance that helped curtail excesses in the exercise of
authority.49
Classical Islamic legal systems generally included a system of Shari'a
courts dominated by scholars known as "qadis" (judges), who were appointed
by rulers. In court proceedings, qadis investigate what the facts actually are,
apply the law and deliver a verdict, which is then expected to be implemented.
At the same time, a theoretically distinct group of scholars50 known as "muftis"
issued legal opinions known as "fatwas." Classical fatwas are legal opinions
that state the law when a given set of facts are assumed. The role of the mufti,
then, is to interpret the meaning of Shari'a. Qadis would routinely consult
fatwas issued by muftis in the determination of their verdicts. In the classical
period, while qadis were appointed by the Caliph, or ruler, the authority to
deliver a fatwa was derived from the intrinsic credibility of the scholar. If
people trusted the knowledge and scholarship of a particular individual, that
person's legal opinions would be highly respected and could not be easily
dismissed by a ruler. According to Islamic legal theory, the source of law was
not the ruler himself, but God. This meant that even the ruler was subject to

47 See VIKOR, supra note 5, at 232-33.
48 See generally NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE
(2008).

49 See id.
50See generally HALLAQ, supra note 3. In practice qadis and muftis were often
the same

individuals, although the function of each remained theoretically distinct.
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the law.5 As such, the question of who determined the content of the law
would be vital.
As the centuries passed, variations on this basic framework for the
location of the law emerged. For example, during the Isma'ili Shi'i-ruled
Fatimid Dynasty (909-1171 CE), each of the Sunni legal schools in Egypt coexisted in pluralistic mutual tolerance. In a single city, each school had its own
chief qadi who adjudicated in accordance with the rules as interpreted by his
own school. In addition, a parallel system of justice developed known as
"mazalim" or "siyasih" courts, where a citizen could appeal directly to the
ruler rather than go through the Shari'a courts.52 Other government officials
such as the "muhtasib" also enforced law in medieval Islamic societies, like a
chief of police or guardian of public order who was empowered to implement
justice on the spot. 53 The interpretation and implementation of Shari'a,
however, remained within the jurisdiction of the muftis and qadis. The power
of the Shari'a always transcended the power of the ruler in theory, even when
its jurisdiction for enforcement was limited.
By the apex of the Ottoman Empire in the 1500's, the ruler began to
increasingly assert direct control over the law, although the Shari'a retained its
theoretical place of legal preeminence. Sultan Sulayman (d. 1566 CE), became
known as "Qanuni" (lawgiver), and during his reign ruler's edicts proliferated
and were systematized. Sultan Sulayman appointed a prestigious legal scholar,
Abu al-Sa'ud, as the Shaykh al-Islam, or Chief Mufti for the Ottoman Empire,
an office that he held from 1545-1574 CE. Abu al-Sa'ud managed to reconcile
the transcendent nature of Shari'a with the increasing centralization of law
through ruler's edicts. This centralization and systemization of law was part of
Sultan Sulayman's increasing assertion of his authority throughout the Ottoman
Empire. 54 Abu al-Sa'ud's ruler-appointed office of the Chief Mufti became an
entrenched part of the Ottoman bureaucracy, and the issuance of fatwas
became increasingly routinized. At a certain point, Abu al-Sa'ud is said to
have issued 2800 fatwas in a single day. 5 Obviously this reflects a high level
of routinization, where an office staff stripped down the questions presented in
the fatwas and enabled simple determinations lacking the complex legal
analysis previously associated with fatwas. The independence of Shari'a
scholars gradually decreased in the Ottoman Empire with the office of the
Chief Mufti increasingly integrated into and subordinate to the authority of the
ruler.
As the centuries passed, the Ottoman rulers routinely appointed both
qadis and muftis, and the "madrassas" (schools) in which these scholars were
educated became increasingly compromised. Students advanced to the highest
appointments based on their associations with wealthy and influential
51See generally FELDMAN, supra note
48.
52

See VIKOR, supra note 5, at 198-202.

5 See id. at 195-98.
54 See generally SAMI ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER INTHE ISLAMIC WORLD 103-13 (2005).
5 See VIKOR, supra note 5, at 214.
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personages, rather than on the intrinsic merits of their scholarship. By the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman bureaucracy included two
Chief Qadis (one for Anatolia and one for the European provinces) a Chief
Mufti, and an array of lesser religious officials, all in service of the Ottoman
state.56 Higher levels of muftis in this context lost their independence and
essentially became State functionaries.
NINETEENTH CENTURY TRANSFORMATIONS
The beginning of the nineteenth century initiated a dramatic period of

transformations in the Middle East. The collision of societies in the Middle
East with the western powers during this period resulted in a complete
remaking of the legal, political, and economic systems in the Middle East.
These transformations happened piecemeal through a series of actions and
responses that gradually left segments of traditional society disenfranchised
while new elites came to prosper.

When their army suffered a series of

military setbacks in the wake of the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1789 CE,
the Ottoman government was deeply shaken. Although the French occupation
of Egypt only lasted until 1801 CE, the Ottoman government began a series of
reforms intended to strengthen its position, starting with changes to the
traditional military system, the Janissaries.

58

The struggle for power between the palace and the military eventually
resolved in favor of the palace, and Sultan Mahmud II crushed the Janissaries
in 1826 CE. Sultan Mahmud II paved the way for the period of dramatic
reform in the Ottoman Empire commonly referred to as the "Tanzimat"
(reordering). 59 After the early reforms of Sultan Mahmud II, the Tanzimat era
introduced a broad series of administrative, legal and fiscal reforms that left
their legacy in the institutions of the modern Middle East. Under intense
European pressure and threat of force, the Ottoman Empire opened up
economic trade with Europe that had devastating consequences to the local
merchants and craftsmen whose interests had traditionally been protected by
the Janissaries. European merchants, fueled by the Industrial Revolution,
began dumping cheap products in the Ottoman markets without restriction,
causing the dislocation of many traditional craftsmen.60 Merchants and
middlemen who traded with the Europeans were often religious minorities
within the Empire. They became newly rich while the power of the old elites
diminished. At the same time, the Europeans put intense pressure on the

56

See id., at 206-17.

57 See HALLAQ, supra note 3, at 83-139.
58 Sultan Selim III's attempts to reform the Janissaries resulted in his deposition
and

execution in 1807 CE.
59

See generally WILLIAM L.CLEVELAND & MARTIN BUNTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN

MIDDLE EAST 82 (4th ed. 2009).
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Ottoman government to alter the legal system to change the status of these
religious minorities, whose interests the Europeans now claimed to protect. 61
Two central Sultanic edicts of the Tanzimat, the Hatt-i-Sharif of 1839
CE and the Hatt-i-Humayun of 1856 CE, included provisions declaring the
equality of all citizens in the Empire, regardless of religion. These provisions
were politically designed to stave off European pressure and address European
concerns.62 However, they ran directly counter to the Muslim scholars'
interpretation of Shari'a provisions, which provided for protection of
Christians and Jews, but not for equality with Muslims under the law. 63 These
edicts not only diminished the power of the Muslim scholars, but also
dismantled the traditional Ottoman system of "millets." The millet system
allowed limited self-rule for Jews, Orthodox and Catholic Christian
communities, with certain aspects of tax collection and administration of
justice directly in the hands of religious leadership in those communities.
Unsurprisingly, these minority community leaders vigorously opposed the new
"equality" of the Tanzimat edicts that were promoted by the Europeans
because their power, prestige and sources of revenue would be severely
curtailed by the edicts' implication. During the Tanzimat, religious minorities
became subject to the draft for military service, causing substantial hardship in
those communities.64 As such, the communities were vocal in their preference
for the system that allowed them to pay a head tax in place of military service,
according to the provisions of Islamic law.
Economic changes were not limited to industry and craftsmen.
Agricultural changes were also significant, favoring cash crops that were sold
to Europeans.65 Many farmers were impoverished and displaced, and flooded
to the cities. Famine and illness spread in waves, devastating the population
and straining the capacity of city infrastructure.66 Other infrastructure
development, however, was rapid and significant. Roads, steamships, railways
and telegraph lines improved communication within the Empire and linked the
Empire with Europe as never before.67 One result of this development was an
increased ability of the government in Istanbul to establish tighter controls over
the provinces and the countryside.
Another result of the growth of
infrastructure was the increasing indebtedness of the Ottoman treasury to

See CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 59, at 81-102.
The text of the Hatt-i-Humayun of 1856 was drafted by the English ambassador to the
Ottoman Empire, Lord Stratford, and issued under diplomatic pressure from Europe as a direct
result of the Crimean War. See Roderic H. Davison, Turkish Attitudes Concerning ChristianMuslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century, in THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 61, 66, supra note
61

62

60. See also RODERIC H. DAVISON, REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1856-76 (1963).
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European finance.68 European bondholders and banks financed the spending
on infrastructure and military improvements, beginning a cycle of debt at
unfavorable interest rates that eventually resulted in Ottoman bankruptcy in
1875 CE. When the Ottoman central treasury was forced into bankruptcy,
European financiers pressured the Ottoman government even harder, and
European advisors took control of the sensitive revenue collection and
expenditure mechanisms vital to the functioning of any government. 69
The institutions that constituted Ottoman society also underwent a
significant transformation during the Tanzimat. As the central government
expanded control, new civil servants were trained and employed. Their
educational training first happened in Europe, and then in new secular schools
established along European models. A Ministry of Education was established
in Istanbul in 1857 CE. This is particularly noteworthy when considering the
fact that Shari'a scholars had previously monopolized the education sector.
Increasing numbers of "modern" men administered hospitals, schools and
government ministries. Land reform was also implemented to the detriment of
the scholarly classes. The Ottoman government appropriated all "waqf'
holdings, an old established form of land-tenure based on Shari'a, which
allowed for inalienable donations of property for charitable purposes. While
the government could not expressly overturn waqf in concept, historically
Shari'a scholars had managed waqf properties as trustees. By exerting
government control over the management of waqf, Shari'a scholars were
deprived of a major source of revenue and economic independence. The
independence of the scholars gradually eroded as they became subject to
government appointment, dismissal, and- reporting to -a government ministry. 70
In addition to diminishing the power of the scholars through increasing
government control of education and waqf, the legal system was finally
brought under the direct control of the government at the expense of the
Shari'a scholars. A Ministry of Justice was established, and secular European
legal codes were translated and adopted. The jurisdiction of Shari'a courts was
severely curtailed by the new system of "nizamiyye" courts established
throughout the Empire.n Gradually, Shari'a courts were reduced to covering
matters of personal status and family law, with all other matters of law referred
to the secular courts. A new legal code, the Ottoman "Majalla" was developed
between 1870 and 1877 CE, and implemented in both the Shari'a and the
nizamiyye courts.72 The Majalla claimed to codify Islamic law. Codification
of the law stripped the scholars of their traditional function as interpreters of

68 See generally ROGER OWEN, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 1800-1914,

at 100-21 (2005).

See id.
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Shari'a, which held a unique answer for each individual situation.73 The status
and relevance of the scholars were severely diminished with codification of the
law, which allowed civil servants to look up what the law stated on any given
set of facts. Elite families increasingly sent their sons to newly prestigious
secular schools in lieu of being trained as classical scholars.74
One of the most important legacies of the Tanzimat period was the
increased centralization of government authority. The central government
gradually took over most aspects of the state. 5 The Tanzimat reforms in
theory promoted democratization and representative forms of government.
New legislative assemblies with elected representatives were created in the
Empire. The Constitution of 1876, designed by the Ottoman statesmen Midhat
Pasha, provided a significant check on the power of the Sultan. 76 However,
political turmoil resulted in 1876, the year of three Sultans, ending with the
coming to power of Sultan Abdu'l-Hamid II. Midhat Pasha fell out of power
and gradually Sultan Abdu'l-Hamid II managed to consolidate an autocratic
centralization of power in his own hands. With each of the traditional power
centers of merchants, janissaries, provincial notables and scholars devastated
by the gradual reforms of the nineteenth century, Sultan Abdu'l-Hamid II
emerged as an unchecked ruler.7 8 When he eventually fell from power, the
mechanics of a centralized government remained in his wake. Ottoman
intellectuals argued about the best way to strengthen the Ottoman Empire, with
some advocating an Islamist revival and others arguing against it, reasoning
that Islam had kept the Ottoman Empire weak and backwards compared to
Europe. 79 In the aftermath of World War I, the European powers carved up the
Ottoman Empire, and only a small portion remained intact to become the
modern nation-state of Turkey.8 0
Egypt also experienced dramatic transformations in the nineteenth
century. While it was formally a part of the Ottoman Empire in theory, Egypt
broke away in fact under the strong, centralized rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha
(d. 1849 CE) after the end of the French occupation in 1802 CE. Muhammad
Ali Pasha increased the control of the government over the countryside,
dramatically reforming both industry and agriculture. 82 European trade had
similar devastating consequences in Egypt, and a similar process of erosion
73 See ZUBAIDA, supra note 54, at 121-57. See also VIKOR, supra note 5, at 222-53.
74 See generally THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST, supra note 60.

75 See id.
76 See generally ROBERT DEVEREUX, THE FIRST OTTOMAN CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD: A
STUDY OF THE MIDHAT CONSTITUTION AND PARLIAMENT (1963).
77 See generally ZUBAIDA, supra note 54; CLEVELAND & BUNTON, supra note 59.
78
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79 See Serif Mardin, Religion and Secularism in Turkey, in THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST,

supra note 60, at 347-74.
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81 See THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST, supra note 60.
82

See id.
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gradually diminished the power of the Shari'a scholars and traditional elites
over the course of the century. Production of cotton became a huge export
industry to Europe, tying the well-being of Egyptian peasants to external price
fluctuations.83 For example, during the Civil War in the United States, the
trade in cotton produced in the South and sold in Europe was interrupted.
Therefore, prices for cotton produced in Egypt soared. After the war, cotton
trade between the U.S. and Europe resumed, and the price of cotton produced
in Egypt dropped, devastating local farmers.84 Commerce was the driving
force behind numerous changes in Egypt. European merchants established
prosperous new districts in Egypt in which to live and to conduct their
businesses. 8 In 1876 CE, mixed courts were introduced to hear cases between
Egyptian nationals and Europeans. 86 These courts were staffed by European
judges and were concerned with matters of commerce. Government debt to
European bankers and bondholders spiraled out of control, and like the central
Ottoman treasury, the government of Egypt went bankrupt. European financial
advisors were brought in to take control of revenue and expenditure in 1876
CE. In 1882 CE, the British military invaded and occupied Egypt, taking
direct control of the country.
Iran experienced similar, though not identical, transformations in the
nineteenth century.88 The Qajar Dynasty was concerned with fending off the
competing European powers and watched the experience of the Ottoman
Empire and Egypt carefully.
European commerce had a similarly
transformative impact on the economy of Iran.89 Iranian reformers and
intellectuals trended toward a more secular, centralized state. Ministries of
education and justice likewise eroded the independence of the Shari'a scholars.
In 1906 CE, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran challenged the power of the
Shah and a power struggle ensued. 90 After World War I, the British helped
place Reza Shah Pahlavi on the throne, ending the Qajar Dynasty. Reza Shah
implemented a secular, centralized form of government and ensured the flow
of oil to western powers.91

83See id; OWEN, supra note
68.
84 See THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST, supra note
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After World War II, when Reza Shah was closer to the Germans than to
the Russians and British, who had threatened to carve up Iran into northern and
southern zones of influence, he was deposed and his son Muhammad Reza
Shah took the throne.92 Increasingly captive to U.S. interests during his rule,
Muhammad Reza Shah continued the policies of a centralized, secular state
with a western-oriented economy. When he was deposed in 1979 CE and the
Islamic Republic of Iran commenced, the scholars proclaimed that they would
be the rulers and that law and government would conform to Shari'a.93
The theory of "vilayet-i-faqih" (guardianship of the jurist) articulated
by Ayatollah Khomeini was a significant departure from traditional Shi'i legal
theory. In Twelver Shi'i theory, the rightful leadership of the Muslim
community belongs to the line of Imams descended from the Prophet
Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah and her husband 'Ali ibn Abi Talib
(the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, first Imam and fourth Caliph). This
line of descendants had spiritual as well as temporal authority over the
community, but the twelfth Imam, known as the Mahdi, disappeared from the
community in the lesser occultation in 874 CE. During the lesser occultation,
he continued to guide his community through a series of four individuals called
"gates," who would communicate with the Imam and then tell the community
of his guidance. In the year 941 CE, this communication ceased and the
community was cut off from the direct guidance of the Imam. 94
Shi'i theory, however, holds that Imam Mahdi did not die, but remains
alive and hidden from the community. In time he will reappear to guide the
community and take his rightful place as both the spiritual and temporal leader.
Over the centuries, Shi'i theory evolved to accommodate the absence of the
hidden Imam's direct guidance. In the early period after his occultation, Shi'i
scholars thought that the functions of the Imam had lapsed in his absence. 95
These functions included judgments on points of law, imposition of legal
penalties, collection of religious tax, and leadership in Friday prayers and
jihad. 96 This served the Shi'i community well, as the theory facilitated a
politically quietist position in the context of the Sunni government's
domination and persecution. For Shi'i, this stance led to a disdain for
government which was, in the view of many scholars, an intrinsically corrupt
usurpation in the absence of the true ruler, the hidden Imam. 97
In order to accommodate the practical needs of the community, the
scholars' theoretical position evolved as the centuries passed, allowing them to
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take on some of the functions of the Imam in his absence.98 They took on
these functions gradually, and only as the deputy of the hidden Imam. The
scholars progressively asserted a more active social role, giving legal
judgments in a gradually increasing jurisdictional scope.99 When Shi'ism was
established as the state religion under the Safavid Dynasty in Iran, the scholars
were incorporated into the state apparatus much like their Sunni counterparts in
the Ottoman Empire. 100 In 1722 CE when the Safavid Dynasty collapsed,
many Iranian scholars fled the chaos and resettled in the holy shrine cities of
Najaf and Karbila in neighboring Iraq, which was in Ottoman territory. 101
There, these scholars developed a vibrant intellectual community with a
delicate relationship to the Shi'i Qajar Dynasty, which subsequently came to
power in Iran. They remained outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Qajar
Shahs, who looked to these scholars for credibility. The Shi'i scholars of Iraq
had tremendous influence among the people of Iran during the Qajar period,
which in turn gave rise to a politically significant role for these scholars. 102
A theoretical dispute arose among the Shi'i scholars during the end of
the Safavid period with important implications for the development of modem
Shi'ism. As the scholars gradually assumed more functions of the hidden
Imam, some held to the idea that they could act in this capacity only where
explicit textual guidance was directly applicable. 103 These scholars were called
"Akhbaris." 104 Other scholars, called "Usulis," were willing to use rational
thought, or 'ijtihad, to reason like their Sunni counterparts, which enabled
them to deliver fatwas on a wider range of issues.10 5 This debate was
protracted and bitter, with bloodshed over the rivalry. At the beginning of the
nineteenth century the Usulis prevailed, and Shi'i scholars were able to
gradually increase their influence and the scope of their legal jurisdiction. 106
Outside the political territory of the Qajar rulers and economically independent
from the government, the Shi'i scholars developed an increasingly centralized
hierarchy with a widening scope of authority. 107
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the concept of a sole "marja'
al-taqlid" (source of imitation) developed. 108 The marja' became the sole
98 KEDDIE, supra note 88, at 9; MOMEN, supra note 4 atl89-91.
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authority on legal questions among the Twelver Shi'i and his determinations
were followed by everyone else. This authority was derived from credibility of
the individual's scholarship, and the marja' was considered the most learned of
the Shi'i scholars by his peers and by the public. He was not appointed by any
ruler, and pronouncements from a marja' could trump the power of the ruler.
For example, in 1890 CE Nasir-i-Din Shah, the Qajar ruler of Iran, granted a
monopoly on the production and distribution of tobacco to British interests. 109
This economic concession threatened the livelihood of Iranian farmers and
merchants. When the marja' Mirza-i-Shirazi (d. 1896 CE) issued a fatwa in
1891 CE that the consumption of tobacco under such circumstances violated
the Shari'a, a tobacco boycott ensued that ruined the value of the
concession.110 It is said that even the Shah's own wives refused to consume
tobacco, much to his consternation. Nasir-i-Din Shah was forced to cancel the
concession in 1892 CE at a financial loss. 11
After this period no single individual was considered the sole marja' in
the Shi'i world, but a few top scholars were considered equally prominent. 112
During the Pahlavi Dynasty, centralized secularization significantly and
systematically reduced the power of the scholars, but the centers of scholarship
in Najaf and Karbila continued to train young people in classical Islamic legal
methodology. Khomeini, exiled from Iran under the Pahlavis, developed the
new theory that in the absence of the hidden Imam, the most learned scholar
should take on even more of the lapsed functions and actually rule in his
place.113 By allowing 'ijtihad, Usuli thought dramatically increased the
theoretical scope of jurisdiction for Shari'a scholars. Khomeini's thought built
on this theoretical foundation, taking it even further by allowing for direct rule
as the Imam's deputy. 114
When the Iranian revolution succeeded, however, and Khomeini
actually came to power, a host of practical issues collided with the theory.1 15
A new Constitution was adopted and Iran had an elected legislative
assembly. 116 The laws previously enacted by the parliament, however, were
not all immediately discarded. The theory provided that all laws had to
conform to the Shari'a, and religious scholars were to vet the Islamicity of
laws passed by parliament. However, thousands of laws were in force that
seemed to have little to do with the Shari'a.1 17 While it was easy to repeal laws
in obvious contradiction to traditional interpretations of Shari'a, many laws
inherited by the Islamic Republic were neutral. 18
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Economic issues such as inflation and high unemployment have
continued to trouble Iran during the years since the revolution. 119
"Foundations," which are quasi-public sector entities, developed as a
significant part of the Iranian economy,120 which remains dominated by oil
exports and therefore vulnerable to the global economy. Economic concerns
play an important role in current politics, with President Ahmadinejad
traditionally said to derive most of his popularity among the poor of south
Tehran's slums and the economically disenfranchised rural areas, where he has
been instrumental in bringing cash and development projects. 121 His political
rivals, favored by the west, are generally considered more likely to represent
middle and upper-class interests. The Revolutionary Guards, with close ties to
President Ahmadinejad, emerged as a major player in Iran's economy, holding
interests in government construction and engineering contracts estimated at
$12 billion. 122 The recent rift between the Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad resulted in the possibility that the
President would be called before the Parliament for a hearing on his handling
of the economy, amid criticism that he has inflicted higher inflation by slashing
food and fuel subsidies.123 Currency fluctuations, rising inflation and the
declining value of the rial cause continuing economic hardship in connection
with sanctions against Iran as part of the nuclear program standoff with the
U.S.124 There has been no easy way to conform the many practical challenges
of governing to the lofty ideal of implementing Shari'a. For example,
Khomeini is reported to have once dismissed an aide worried about inflation,
saying that "this revolution was not about the price of watermelons." 125
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MODERN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

Modern Islamist political movements are marked by tremendous
diversity.126 Some have adopted violence as a method to take power, while
some are non-violent. Some want to participate in elections while others do
not. Some Islamist movements call for immediate implementation of Shari'a,
while others want a gradual process. While most Islamist movements employ
implementation of Shari'a as a political platform, it is not always clear exactly
what that platform would mean in practical application.127 The appeal of
Islamist movements is also diverse. The rule of law that Shari'a represented in
the classical period, serving as an effective check on the power of the ruler,
may be part of the appeal of calls for Shari'a. 128 The idea that a modem
government can implement Shari'a, however, raises challenging questions.
With the gradual subordination of law to the state since the nineteenth century,
how can the law be extricated from the state by means of a modern state
apparatus implementing Shari'a?
The twentieth century saw a wave of modern secular nationalism as the
dominant political and intellectual paradigm in the Middle East.129 Each
nation has distinct specific circumstances and experiences, and there are
important exceptions to this dominant paradigm such as the experience of
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.130
However, the trend represented
prominently by the experience of Turkey, Egypt, and Iran is important in
understanding the current geopolitical context of the rise of Islamist politics.
As the "reordering" of the nineteenth century gave way to the violent
convulsions of World War I and World War II, the modem Middle East
splintered into multiple modern nation-states following western political
models. 131 The twentieth century was characterized by increasingly dominant
central governments ruling in close step with the military. 132 The major
influential figures of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey,
Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran, and Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser in Egypt all came from a
military background. 133 Whether allied with the West or the Soviet Union in
the Cold War, society was secularized. The power and authority of traditional
126
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elites, including Shari'a scholars, was systematically eroded. The economic
systems were increasingly integrated with western interests and thus became
vulnerable to the "world economy." 134 What remained in the aftermath of the
nineteenth and twentieth century were completely reordered economic, legal,
and political systems and institutions in the Middle East.
The widespread discontent left by the legacy of the nineteenth and
twentieth century transformations has increasingly found expression in the
popularity of Islamist political movements.135 Like a pendulum swing, secular
nationalism is increasingly being replaced as the dominant intellectual
paradigm in the Middle East by the emergence of Islamist political thought.
This can seem extremely threatening to the portions of the populations in the
Middle East that are rooted in the secularized systems that prevailed in the past
century. Critics worry about the status of women, religious freedom and
human rights. 136 Until recently, many Islamist politicians have done little to
reduce this threat, choosing to emphasize the aspects of Shari'a that are most
provocative to westerners and westernized Middle Easterners. 137 In a
reductionist way, Shari'a is sometimes represented by politicians (both for and
against its implementation) as a call to stone adulterers and apostates, cut off
the hands of thieves, and repress women without context or regard for the
progressive, tolerant nature of Islamic law in both theory and in historical
implementation. 138 The embrace of this conception of Shari'a "others" the
west and acts as a clear cultural marker to push back against the experience of
western domination during the past two centuries. 139 The appeal of this
approach channels popular resentment and anger in combination with the
positive Islamist record of providing charitable social services to the poor.
Islamist parties have generally enjoyed good reputations for their lack of
corruption delivering these services, particularly in comparison to their secular
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nationalist political rivals. 140 The Islamist popular slogan "Islam is the
Solution" can inspire hope where disillusion is widespread. 141
Islamist political movements have gradually developed as an
alternative to the politics of the rulers. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for
example, was sharply repressed under Nasser. 142 When his successor Sadat
needed to develop a distinct power base and distance himself from Nasser's
pro-Soviet policies, he carefully cultivated the Islamists with the help of Saudi
Arabia, which was allied to the United States. 143 When Sadat pushed through
reforms advancing the status of women in the 1970's, he felt the need to assert
their compatibility with Shari'a. He cultivated Al-Azhar scholars, persuading
them to issue fatwas endorsing the reforms. 144 The Constitution of Egypt was
amended in 1971 CE to state that the "principles of Shari'a are a principal
source of legislation." In 1980 CE it was amended again to state that the
principles of Shari'a are the principal source of legislation in Egypt.145 How
can this provision be implemented in a meaningful way when the legislative,
judicial, and executive branches of government remain institutional forms
derived from the legacy of the nineteenth and twentieth century?
The Egyptian legal scholar 'Abd al Razzaq Al-Sanhuri drafted the
Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 with the intent of merging western civil codes
with the Shari'a, similar to the example of the Ottoman Majalla. 14 Sanhuri
was forced into retirement by Nasser, and went on to help draft similar codes
for several other Middle Eastern states.147 The problems inherently presented
by attempting to codify Shari'a are serious, as codification not only transforms
the theoretical ideal that Shari'a contains a perfect answer for each individual
situation, but also raises the practical question of which school's interpretations
to codify.
Codification leaves something in its place which may resemble Shari'a,
but cannot really be called Shari'a in the classical sense. 148 If modern Islamists
decide to approach implementation of Shari'a through legislative codification,
they first have to resolve basic practical questions. Is a legislative system
theoretically compatible with Shari'a at all, since it presumes that law can be
derived from popular will rather than originating with God? If a legislative
system is acceptable, how will the Islamicity of laws be determined? Who will
be qualified to vet the Islamicity of laws? How will those individuals be
selected? How will they be educated and trained? Who will they answer to?
140
141
142
143
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Will all laws from the previous regime by immediately thrown out? Will a
procedure be put into place to vet new laws only? Will the existing laws be
gradually vetted over time and thrown out only if determined to conflict with
Shari'a? Will there be a category of laws that are determined to be neutral
with respect to Shari'a (like Khomeini's statement on the price of
watermelon)?
In Egypt, the legal profession is firmly entrenched, politically active,
and trained in western-oriented educational institutions.149 Lawyers and judges
may be devout Muslims and some may be Islamists, but they are not typically
classically trained in Islamic law. There tends to be a tension generally
between the current classically trained scholars and the Islamist politicians.
Some Islamist politicians see some of the classically trained scholars as no
longer credible, having become captive to oppressive governments. This
criticism asserts that these captive scholars offered "fatwas for sale," having
been willing to issue legal opinions to justify the policies of the rulers even as
those policies changed.1 50 Some traditional scholars, on the other hand, look
disdainfully at Islamist politicians, who speak in the name of Shari'a but have
no training in the classical methods of Islamic law. In Egypt, the constitutional
provisions declaring the principles of the Shari'a to be the principal source of
legislation created the odd result of having the theoretically secular judiciary
deliver verdicts on the Islamicity of laws.15 1 In classical Islamic legal systems,
there were no lawyers in the modern sense. If the judicial system remains in
place as it is currently constituted under an Islamist government, how will this
tension be resolved? Will future judges be trained in the methods of the
classical scholars?
In the Middle East, political, legal, and economic institutions were
thoroughly transformed by the experience of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Modern Islamists are increasingly coming to power through
elections in the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011.152 The Arab Spring swept
aside the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in popular uprisings calling for
democratic change.153 Modem Islamist parties willing to participate in
parliamentary elections have won majorities in both Tunisia and Egypt, where
such elections have been held. These Islamist parties, along with many other

See BROWN, supra note 86, at 122.
See ZUBAIDA, supra note 54, at 164.
151 See generally, BROWN, supra
note 86.
152 See Peter Beaumont, PoliticalIslam Poised to Dominate the
New World Bequeathed by
Arab
Spring,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Dec.
3,
2011,
available
at
149
150

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/03/political-islam-poised-arab-spring
Apr. 26, 2012).

(last visited

153 See generally Lisa Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring-Parsingthe Differences
Between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, FOREIGN AFFS, May-Jun. 2011 (describing the Arab

Spring).

220

221

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2012

Islamists, are rapidly negotiating change in Middle East political systems. 154
They are accommodating their agendas to the reality of the political, legal, and
economic systems they now stand to inherit.
One striking point is the potential of Islamic finance to play a
significant bridging role. Respected by both classical scholars and modem
Islamists, Islamic finance institutions and practitioners have remained
decidedly non-political as they have grown into an industry worth hundreds of
billions of dollars spread all over the globe.15 5 Islamic finance prohibits the
use of riba (unjustified increase) and gharar (excessive speculation), and
promotes profit-and-loss sharing, halal(legally permissible) economic activity,
and economic justice.156 Islamist politicians call for Shari'a-compliant finance,
notably expressing their intent to prohibit interest on debt.157 This confirms
the cultural marker that was attractive to their constituents about earlier forms
of Islamist politics, without seriously provoking the west, which has
substantial economic interests in the Islamic finance industry.15 8 Even calls
for Islamic finance have been careful not to seem too radical. Ennahda, the
newly elected Islamist party in Tunisia, recently took care to emphasize that
Islamic finance would be only one economic option among many, and that the
basic economic and constitutional systems would remain intact and secular. 159
If Islamic finance can move beyond its current limitations, it might
serve as one tool for governments to meaningfully impact the alleviation of
poverty and promote economic and social justice. There will be no simple
answers, however, to the systemic social and economic issues that confront the
Middle East today. 160 The radical transformations in the economic and
political institutions of the Middle East over the last two centuries have been
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accompanied by explosions in population and literacy, along with widespread
demographic shifts from rural to urban centers.161 For example, a rough
estimate of the Iranian population in 1850 was 10 million.162 The population
of Iran is estimated in 2012 around 78.8 million.163 A rough estimate of the
population of Egypt in 1800 was 3 million. 164 The population of Egypt in
2012 is estimated around 83.6 million. 165 The population of Cairo in 1798 CE
was estimated at 263,000.166 The population of Cairo in 2009 was estimated
around 10.9 million. 167 Egypt's literacy rate in 1907 was estimated at just 7
percent. 168 The literacy rate in Egypt estimated by the World Bank in 2006
was 66 percent. 169 The literacy rate among Turks in 1927 was estimated at 8
percent. 170 The literacy rate in Turkey estimated by the World Bank in 2009
was 91 percent.
Revolutionary communications technology advances
provide unparalleled information access across the Middle East through the
media, cell phones and the internet.172 Youth in the Middle East are a
disproportionately large demographic category, 173 and they are increasingly
well-educated. Yet the gap between the rich and the poor continues to increase
and unemployment continues to rise.17 4
These social and economic issues are at the core of the worst (though
not the only) discontent in the Middle East, as evidenced by the patterns
around unemployment and high commodity prices that unfolded during the
Arab Spring. The prominent Tunisian Islamist Rashid Gannouchi has stated
his desire to achieve a prosperous, democratic Muslim state led by a religious
party which protects individual liberties, modeled after the Turkish Justice and
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Development Party led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.17 This
trend among modem Islamists is spreading, leading some commentators to call
it "post-Islamist." 176 How the societies and institutions of the "post-Islamist"
Middle East emerge and develop in this context will remain to be seen. Newly
elected Islamist governments in Egypt and Tunisia have inherited an economic
recession and high unemployment levels along with the high expectations
unleashed by the Arab Spring.177 Significant rivalries and distinctions remain
among Islamist parties, both in and out of power,17 8 and a variety of
approaches are possible to address the concerns they face. The challenges of
negotiating meaningful, positive social and economic change in the context of
the legacy of the nineteenth and twentieth century transformations are
formidable. .
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